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Abstract: 
This chapter examines why policy decision-makers opt for command and control 
environmental regulation despite the availability of a plethora of market-based 
instruments which are more efficient and cost-effective. Interestingly, Sri Lanka has 
adopted a wholly command and control system, during both the pre and post liberalisation 
economic policies. This chapter first examines the merits and demerits of command and 
control and market-based approaches and then looks at Sri Lanka’s extensive 
environmental regulatory framework. The chapter then examines the likely reasons as to 
why the country has gone down the path of inflexible regulatory measures and has 
become entrenched in them. The various hypotheses are discussed and empirical 
evidence is provided. The chapter also discusses the consequences of an environmentally 
slack economy and policy implications stemming from adopting a wholly regulatory 
approach. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main results. 
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and empirical evidence is provided. The chapter also discusses the consequences of an 
environmentally slack economy and policy implications stemming from adopting a 
wholly regulatory approach. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main 
results. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
It is with great pleasure that we write this festschrift chapter in honour of Professor 
Buddhadasa Hewavitharana, one of the few well versed and versatile economists of pre 
and post liberalisation economic policies. Hence, it is apt to select a topic on command 
and control (C&C) pollution control approaches which is synonymous with pre-market 
reforms and compare them with market-based instruments (MBIs) which are an inherent 
part of open market economic policies.  
 
In this chapter we examine why industry favours a C&C approach despite the many 
advantages MBIs offer. This is especially so in a post economic liberalisation era when 
a plethora of MBIs are available with clear advantages.  It is interesting to note that Sri 
Lanka has a history of using only C&C approaches to mitigate pollution. The country is 
yet to implement MBIs. The consequence of such an approach is that it creates no 
dynamic incentive for firms to innovate or to use more efficient technologies. C&C are 
also not cost-effective. On the other hand, MBIs can be designed to create the desired 
incentives for polluters. Furthermore, MBIs are less cumbersome. However, despite its 
merits, MBIs, too, have drawbacks, which mean that they should be examined on a case 
by case before implementation. In some situations, a mixture of C&C and MBIs are 
warranted, depending on the situation.  
 
The regulatory and environmental economic literature is relevant to answer as to why a 
country would go down the path of using only C&C approaches and why firms may 
favour or demand a regulatory approach.  The theory and empirical evidence drawn 
from the relevant literature ranges from public acceptability, precautionary principle, 
capture theory to pollution haven hypothesis. These hypotheses are dealt with in detail 
and illustrated by appropriate diagrams not attempted before. We also demonstrate the 
consequences of such action which are likely to impact on economic growth and the 
welfare of the country.  There are many policy implications stemming from adopting a 
wholly C&C regulatory approach. Such an approach also sends incorrect signals to 
potential investors.  However, it must be mentioned here that despite these arguments, 
introducing MBIs also mean establishing a new setup for pollution control which the 
country has to experiment with which may take many years or even decades to perfect.  
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 The challenges that lie ahead are many, including polluter opposition and overcoming 
political and bureaucratic hurdles. 
 
The chapter is set out as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the command and 
control vs. market-based approaches, and Section 3 presents a discussion on what 
pollution control approaches are used in Sri Lanka. Section 4 discusses the likely 
reasons for a wholly C&C regulatory bias.  In Section 5, we discuss the environmental 
and health effects, and Section 6 discusses the policy implications. Section 7 
concludes with a discussion of the main results. 
 
2.  Command and control vs. market-based approaches 
 
Production of any form inevitably generates pollution. However, it is not always 
necessary to clean-up all the pollution if the assimilative capacity of the environment is 
greater than the amount of pollution and no negative externalities are present. It is only 
when the pollution generated by a firm or firms put together exceeds the assimilative 
capacity of the environment and negative externalities occur that preventive action is 
necessary. This is shown in Figure 1. 
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Source: Adapted from Turner et al., (1994, p.75). 
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 As pointed out by Turner et al., (1994) when output increases so does the amount of 
pollution which has to be assimilated by the environment. However, with increasing 
production, the amount of pollution released exceeds the assimilative capacity of the 
environment.  Hence, pollution released becomes a problem.  Figure 1 shows that at 
QA output produced is equal to the amount of pollution released into the environment. 
When output increases beyond QA then the environmental assimilative capacity is 
exceeded. 
 
Once the pollution released into the environment is greater than the assimilative 
capacity, it begins to impose external costs on society. Furthermore, the external costs 
increase with increasing output. A simple illustration of this is shown in Figure 2.  As 
can be seen, marginal external costs (MEC) increase as pollution accumulates with 
increasing production. Hence, the damage done to the environment, too, increases 
when the per unit of output increases. 
 
Figure 2:  Increasing output and marginal external costs 
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Source: Adapted from Turner et al., (1994, p.76). 
 
In order to avoid pollution damage to the environment and hence society, it is 
important to take into account marginal external costs and internalise them. This is 




 Figure 3:  Marginal net private benefit, marginal external costs and social optimum  
                level of output 
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Source: Adapted from Turner et al., (1994, p.76). 
 
In Figure 3, the social optimum level of output is at Qs. This is obtained by 
subtracting the external costs from the producers’ MNPB. It is the responsibility of 
the respective decision-makers to take into the social costs of production and compel 
polluters to pay for the pollution they generate.  Only when these external costs are 
taken into account (internalized) that production will move from a private profit 
driven market optimal level of output to a socially optimal level of output.  In other 
words a private firm’s market decision rule is that output should be produced if the 
firm gains a positive marginal net private benefit (MNPB) (i.e. if MR>MVC), up to 
the point where MR=MVC, the market optimum level of output.  If the regulators  are 
to take into account the costs of pollution into account then the social decision rule is 
that external costs (MEC) must be included in the market price of the good produced.  
In other words, polluters should be made to pay for the pollution they generate in 
producing goods and services. 
 
The primary virtue of a market system is that it shows the cost of conserving a 
commodity or providing a service and to producers what values consumers place on 
them. However, an unfettered market system does not take into account the true value of 
using non-market, freely provided environmental resources. Hence, freely available 
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 environmental goods and services are over utilized and unfettered markets use resources 
inefficiently. In other words, as Turner et al., (1994) point out ‘there is a divergence 
between private and social costs’. This concept was discussed in Figure 3 above. 
 
Hence, as demonstrated in Figure 3, there is a need to account for the social costs in 
market prices of manufactured goods and services. This is known as the polluter pays 
principle which MBIs have been designed to achieve. MBIs can be contrasted with a 
direct regulatory C&C approach. Regulatory C&C approaches  require changes in 
behaviour by introducing penalties for parties who don’t comply with the regulatory 
provisions. There are different types of C&C instruments which include standards 
(including planning instruments), licensing, mandatory management plans and 
covenants. 
 
A commonly used C&C approach is setting uniform standards for firms and often (and 
most common) are setting standards in relation to technology and/or performance 
(Stavins, 2003, ch 9). As Stavins points out ‘Technology-based standards specify the 
method, and sometimes the actual equipment, that firms must use to comply with a 
particular regulation. A performance standard sets a uniform control target for firms, 
while allowing some latitude in how this target is met’. As Young (1992) points out, 
one of the reasons why C&C is favoured is because less information is required to 
introduce them. 
 
One of the criticisms of the C&C approach is based on firms being regulated to the 
same target which is expected to be costly and even counterproductive. While 
theoretically this approach is intended to limit pollution, it is likely to impose different 
costs to different firms and costs can vary between firm’s characteristics such as age, 
location and other factors. Such an approach may also lead to firms’ to ‘alter’ their 
behaviour in order to avoid or reduce the costs of compliance. Furthermore, policing 
compliance is no doubt expensive with no revenue generated.  It is likely that most of 
the compliance costs have to be borne by the regulator since the costs of issue a licence 
is low. In addition, there are other drawbacks as well which are well documented in the 
environmental economics literature (see for example, Callan and Thomas, 2007).  Some 
of them include: C&C allow little flexibility in achieving pollution targets; does not 
encourage innovation; or provide incentives for polluters to change behaviour in order 
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 to reduce pollution and be rewarded; does not encourage competitors to reduce 
pollution; monitoring of thousands of production units is a very costly affair for the 
regulator; and historically, penalties have been set below the social cost of production 
(where it contributes to market failure and inefficiency).  This aspect is discussed 
further later in this section. 
 
On the other hand, MBIs are policy tools that encourage behavioural change through 
market signals rather than through explicit directives or ‘one size fits all’ approaches.  
It has been argued that MBIs are ‘regulations that encourage behaviour through 
market signals rather than through explicit directives regarding pollution control 
levels and methods’ (Stavins, 2003) discussed above.  MBIs are designed to make use 
of market forces (Stavins, 1988; OECD, 1989, 1998) if well designed and 
implemented enable polluters to undertake pollution control that enable sustainable 
production (benefits them in the long-term) and also meet regulator objectives. Such 
as system also generates revenue as opposed to C&C where most of the regulator 
costs have to be borne by the regulator.  MBIs encourage polluters who can most cost 
effectively provide environmental improvements. There is a growing interest in MBIs 
because they can, where applicable, deliver equivalent outcomes at lower cost by 
allowing firms the flexibility to decide on whether to change their actions or incur 
higher costs. Importantly, regulators do not require detailed information on who is 
best placed to make changes and how. This information is ‘revealed’ by the market. 
However, it must be mentioned here that MBIs often require some regulatory 
underpinning in order to make them work. 
 
A large number of countries that rely on market forces now use MBIs (for a 
discussion see Stavins, 2003). They are both in developed and developing countries. 
Where appropriate and necessary MBIs are complemented with the CAC approach 
(for a discussion see Seroa Da Motta et al., 1999).  Very few countries, especially 
those that rely on market forces adopt a wholly C&C regulatory approach. Hundreds 
of MBIs or variants have been developed and implemented which range from 
pollution charges (fees or charges); tradeable permits; market friction reductions and 





The various C&C and MBIs available for policy decision-makers have been neatly 
summarised by Seroa Da Motta et al., (1998).  This is shown in Table 1. As can be 
seen, a plethora of instruments are available for pollution control and depending on 
the type of pollution, institutional capacity and other factors, instruments can be 
selected by the policy decision-makers to suit their comparative advantage. 
 
The various instruments that are available for pollution mitigation were discussed and 
very briefly the main advantages and disadvantages between the two approaches were 
noted. Before, concluding this section we demonstrate as to why an MBI instrument 
can be more effective than a C&C approach. For this purpose, we compare a pollution 
tax (which has traditionally been more effective) with a penalty set for violating a 
fixed standard for effluents or emissions.. Interestingly, real world experience shows 
that penalties for violating a fixed standard have been historically set ‘too’ low).  This 
is shown in Figure 4. Table 1: Classification of policy instruments available for pollution mitigation 
         Minimum Flexibility                                                                         Moderate Flexibility                                                                   Maximum Flexibility 
                  Maximum Government Involvement                                                                                                               Increased Private Initiative 
           Control Oriented                                                                                           Market Oriented                                                              Litigation Oriented 






Regulator restricts nature and amount of 
pollution or resource use for investors.   
Compliance is monitored and sanctions made 
(fines, closure, jail terms for non-compliance 
Effluent or user 
charges: 
Regulator charges fee 
to individual polluters 
or resource use.  Fee is 
high enough to create 
incentives to reduce 
impacts 
Transferable permits: 
Regulator establishes a 
system of tradable 
pollution or resource use 
permits and monitors 
compliance.  Polluters or 
resource users trade 
permits at unregulated 
market prices 
Performance rating: 
Regulator supports a 
labelling or performance 
rating program that 
requires disclosure of 
environmental 
information on the final 
end-use of the product 
 
Strict liability legislation: 
The polluter by law is required 
to pay any damages to those 
affected.  Damaged parties 
collect settlements through 
litigation and courts system 
Specific examples of application 
¾  Pollution standards 
¾  Licensing of economic activities 
¾  Land use restrictions 
¾  Environmental guidelines 
¾  Fines for spills 
¾  Bans applied to use of certain materials 
¾  Quotas 
¾  Non-compliance 
pollution charges 
 





¾  Pollution taxes 
Tipping fees 
 
¾  User charges 
¾  Deposit-refund 
systems for solid and 
hazardous wastes 
¾  Property rights 





¾  Education regarding 
recycling and re-use 
¾  Disclosure 
legislation requiring 
manufacturers to 
publish solid, liquid 
and toxic waste 
generation 
¾  Blacklist of polluters 
¾  Damages compensation 
¾  Liability on neglecting 
workers and 
environmental authorities 
Source: Adapted from Seroa Da Motta et al., (1998).   
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 Theoretically, introducing a fixed standard for effluents or emissions should limit the 
amount of pollution released into the environment. This is shown at QF of firm’s 
output.  The amount of pollution released is WF.  However, if the fine set for violating 
the standard limits a fine is imposed. If this is set too low, (as experience shows), 
which is shown by the broken line, then firms may only reduce pollution where the 
penalty>MNPB. In other words, reducing output from QM  to QP (reducing emissions 
from WM  to WP).  On the other hand, the tax, t* has been set to achieve the socially 
optimum output at QS where pollution generated is WS. This is efficient, where as if 
the penalty is to be efficient, then the level of penalty has to be increased to the level 
of tax, t*. 
 
Figure 4:  Comparing the effectiveness of a pollution tax with a fixed emissions  
                 standard associated with penalties 
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Source: Adapted from Turner et al., (1994, p.169). 
 
 
Figure 4 clearly demonstrates why emissions standards where fines are set too low 
are inefficient. Historically, this has been the case with pollution standard 
penalties. With these arguments in mind we examine the experience of pollution 
control approaches adopted by policy decision-makers in Sri Lanka. 
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  3.  What pollution control instruments are used in Sri Lanka? 
 
With Sri Lanka’s participation in the United Nations Conference on Human 
Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, the policy decision-makers have expressed a 
keen interest in protecting and conserving the country’s natural resource endowment. 
However, the national responses have remained sporadic and ad hoc until safe 
guarding the environment was embodied in the constitution of the country in 1978.  
Article 24(14) of the Constitution reads ‘The State shall protect, preserve and improve 
the environment for the benefit of the community’. Article 28 states ‘it is the duty of 
every person in Sri Lanka to protect nature and conserve its riches’.  Interestingly, in 
the same year Sri Lanka adopted open market economic policies which meant 
lessening of reliance on C&C approaches and a greater role for market forces to play a 
part.   
 
However, despite the market forces playing a great role in the economy, the approach 
Sri Lanka has adopted in protecting the environment and mitigating pollution has 
been one of C&C despite the availability of many MBIs to mitigate pollution and to 
protect the environment. This is one area that Sri Lanka has lagged behind despite the 
many disadvantages of C&C approaches and what MBIs have to offer as discussed in 
Section 2. The reasons as to why Sri Lanka continues to rely on inflexible, and to 
some extent outdated and in-effective approaches, are dealt with in Section 4. 
However, before that we discuss further Sri Lanka’s heavy emphasis and reliance on 
C&C approaches.  
 
With the enactment of the new constitution in 1978, a national seminar was sponsored 
by the government with the main objective of soliciting recommendations of desirable 
legal reforms, suitable institutional and administrative structures, dissemination of 
information and education and training for the effective protection and efficient 
management of the environment. The outcome of these recommendations was the 
drafting of the National Environmental Act (NEA) which was passed by the 
Parliament in August 1980 and the establishment of Central Environmental Authority 
(CEA). The main objective of establishing CEA was to ‘make provisions’ for the: 
 




•  regulation maintenance and control of the quality of the environment 
•  prevention, abatement and control of pollution 
 
The strategy adopted of achieving these objectives since the NEA was passed was 
largely through legal instruments. Two significant examples to this effect are the 
Environmental Protection License (EPL) scheme for those industries that discharge 
effluents in 1988 and the introduction of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) to 
all development projects in 1993. The CEA thus became the implementing arm of the 
NEA and, therefore, took the position of the main regulatory agency of the 
government for the protection and management of the environment in the country. As 
reflected in the title, CEA is seen as the body of the government exercising its 
‘authority’ as a regulatory agency. The underlying concept is that the protection of the 
environment is possible only through C&C approaches. As an example of this 
regulatory approach in Sri Lanka, Table 2 shows the polluting status, type of firm and 
number of firms registered with the Board of Investment (BOI) in the country from 
1996-2007. The districts and provinces where they are located is also shown.  What is 
interesting here is that one single standard may be applied to specified firms 
producing the same product (e.g. textiles), no matter where they are located in the 
country. Environmental sensitivity of the district or province may not be taken into 
account.  This is a problem because we know that the assimilative capacity of the 






Percentage of firms in 
each sector   
Percentage of firms in each 
district 
Percentage of firms 
in each province 
Number of firms as a 





















CH =33,FD =26, 
TL =26,MP =7, 
IE =4,BM = 2, 






SU= 6,NE = 3, 
UV= 2,NW= 1, 

















Number of sectors =12  Number of districts =18  Number of 
provinces = 8  100.00 
Note (i): Abbreviations (1) sectors: BM -Basic metal, CH -Chemical sector, FD -Food sector,  ME- Machinery and equipment, MP- mineral products, PP-Paper and pulp, SL-
Lodging service and hotels, SP- Power services,  TL-Textile and leather,  TR-Transport and transport services,  TW-Timber and Wood industry, IE-not defined. 
(2) Districts: AD – Anuradhapura, AP – Ampara, BD – Badulla, GL – Galle, HB –Hambantota, KE –Kegalle, KG-Kurunegala, KT-Kalutara, KY- Kandy, MG-Moneragalle, 
MR-Matara, MT-Matale, NW- Nuwara Eliya, PO- Polonaruwa, RN-Ratnapura, TC-Trincomalee, CM-Colombo, GQ- Gampaha. 
(3) Provine:  WE- Western, SU- Southern, CE-Central ,  NE – North Eastern, NC- North Central, NW – North Western, SA – Sabaragamuwa,UV - Uwa 
Note (ii) *  This row shows the total number under each classification. 
 
Source: Board of Investment of Sri Lanka (2008).
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 The enforcement of all provisions under the NEA is undertaken by the BOI in respect 
of all projects established within its Export Processing Zones (EPZ).  In respect of 
enterprises outside the export processing zones, BOI grants environmental clearance 
and issues environmental protection licences after obtaining the necessary clearance 
from the CEA (BOI, 2008). 
 
Other means of environmental management are either not considered nor are they 
understood. This is despite MBIs being widely discussed in the relevant literature and 
implemented in some countries (for example see, OECD, 1989; Da Motta, et al., 
1999). For instance, the OECD (1989) discussed these instruments in the late 1980s 
while MBIs have been debated in the USA since the 1970s (Nelson, 1987; Hanley et 
al., 1997).It appears that reliance on C&C approaches for pollution control, at least for 
firms registered with the BOI involves adhering to specified standards set for firms 
depending on the type of pollutant. An example of a typical pollution standard 
(ambient air quality) set for registered firms with BOI is shown in Table 3. For other 




 Table 3:  An example of ambient air quality standards set by the environmental  






























0.10(0.05) Colorimetric  using 
Saltzman method or 







Sulfur Dioxide  mg/m
3 
(ppm) 
0.08(0.03) Pararosaniline  method 
Or equivalent (Pulsed 
fluorescent method) 












Method or equivalent 
(ultra violet 
photometric method) 
Lead Annual  mg/m
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0.10 Hi-volume  sampling 
And gravimetric  24 hr  0.30 
8 hr  0.35 
3 hr  0.45 
1 hr  0.50 
*Minimum number of observations required to determine the average over the 
specified period: 03 hour average – 03 consecutive hourly average. 
    08 hour average – 06 hourly average. 
                      24 hour average – 18 hourly average. 
                                  Yearly average – 09 monthly averages with at least 02 monthly  
                                  average each quarter. 
       By wet chemistry methods or by automated analysers 
 
Source: Board of Investment of Sri Lanka (2008). 
 
Interestingly, despite these precise pollution standards being set, it appears that these 
standards have not been able to mitigate pollution judging by the continual 
degradation of the environment due to the discharge of pollutants, particularly waste 
16 
 water to water bodies causing deteriorating water quality. It must be pointed out here 
that very few polluters exceeding the set uniform standards have been penalised and 
even in such cases, the penalties have been low. A scenario of setting low penalties 
was shown in Figure 4, in Section 2. Judging by the pollution generated and the 
external costs generated, it is obvious that C&C approaches have not had their desired 
effect. Judging by the budget set aside for EPA to enforce these standards, it is not 
surprising that non-compliance is high.  Furthermore, little action has been taken to 
rectify the situation. 
 
However, policy decision-makers have realised the limitations of the C&C approach 
and hence they have initiated a number of preliminary studies to assess the suitability 
of MBIs to mitigate environmental pollution since 1994. For instance, a study 
undertaken in 1994 by Environmental Resources Management (ERM) Ltd. U.K. 
recommended levying a fee on the volume of waste water discharged by industries to 
reduce waste water pollution. Furthermore, another study entitled “The introduction 
of effluent charges as a means of controlling water pollution in Sri Lanka” conducted 
by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) in 1998 recommended the use of a fee-based 
charge on the Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) load contained in waste water 
discharged into the environment. A more comprehensive study with a plan for 
implementation was presented under the Environmental Action One Project (EA1P) 
in 2002 funded by the World Bank. These initiatives to introduce MBIs to date have 
been confined to paper. However, the seriousness of the deteriorating water quality in 
the country has drawn the attention of the policy decision-makers in recent years to 
MBIs. The action that was decided was to implement a wastewater discharge fee 
(WDF) program from July 2008 which, however, has not come into force yet. Here, 
too, the emphasis was on legal concerns of WDF, while paying some attention to 
institutional aspects, rather than the technical and economic aspects of WDF. The 
focus of CEA is still largely on compliance rather than on arresting pollution. At 
present, the CEA has set a target to prosecute at least a minimum of 100 violators per 
year.  
 
Therefore, MBIs for environmental management and protection are yet to be 
introduced in Sri Lanka.  The question that arises then is what are the reasons for Sri 
17 
 Lanka to be slow in complementing CAC approaches with MBIs?  The likely 
hypotheses are discussed in Section 4. 
 
4.  Likely reasons for a wholly C&C regulatory bias 
 
As the analysis in Section 3 showed Sri Lanka relies heavily on a C&C approach to 
maintain environmental quality. What is also interesting is that despite Sri Lanka 
undertaking open market economic reforms and deregulating some of the major 
public utilities since 1978, the environmental approaches and solutions have been 
wholly C&C.  
 
So why has Sri Lanka adopted and continue to rely on C&C approaches despite the 
inefficiencies and  short shortcoming of a regulatory approach and benefits that could 
be had from MBIs to mitigate pollution and maintain environmental quality? In order 
to explain these phenomena, literature from regulatory and environmental economics 
is used.   
 
This question has been examined partly by Hahn (1989); Cumberland (1990) and 
Hanley (1998) in the environmental economics literature and by Viscusi et al., (1995); 
Church and Ware (2000) in regulatory economics.  Based on the literature, we present 
a few scenarios below. 
 
One view put forward is that there is ignorance on the part of policy decision-makers 
(Hanley et al., 1998).  Beckerman (1975) has argued that policy decision makers have 
been unaware of the advantages of MBIs.  In Sri Lanka, this might have been the case 
prior to 1978 economic liberalisation policies, but the same could not be said after the 
1978 reforms, especially in the last two decades where MBIs have been well known 
to decision-makers and they have been widely used in some countries, including 
developing countries. This is especially so because many Sri Lankan environmental 
managers, lawyers and economists have had at least some form of training in 
countries where these instruments are widely used.  Hanley et al., (1997) point out 
that ignorance is no longer the case, at least in industrialised countries such as the UK 
and the US. A survey conducted by Hanley et al., (1990) among policy decision-
18 
 makers and regulators in the UK found at least a superficial knowledge of economic 
instruments among them.  
 
We know from the regulatory economics literature that one straightforward approach 
to addressing market failure arising from environmental pollution is for governments 
to adopt ‘legal coercion’ (Church and Ware, 2000). In other words, to adopt a C&C 
approach. This action would be consistent with Sri Lanka’s 1978 constitution which 
pledges to safeguard the environment. For example, see article 24(14) of the 
constitution discussed in Section 3. A C&C approach is one way of ensuring that 
adequate environmental safeguards are in place. Furthermore, according to the 
regulator, a C&C approach becomes all the more relevant and justified where 
persistence substances are being released into the environment or when the pollution 
could result serious health damage, or when there is uncertainty about the pollution 
impacts.  Those regulators with a background outside economics prefer this approach. 
In such a case the precautionary principle (e.g. a safe minimum standard) is applied 
by the regulator. Hence, if the goal is to totally prevent some emission or effluent, 
then strict regulation becomes the preferred instrument which is more efficient, 
dependable and theoretically the safest approach to take. Furthermore, such an 
approach is also politically attractive and acceptable. 
 
Hence, a C&C approach adopted by the regulator could also be due to a response to 
the public’s demand to address market failure (see for example, Church and Ware, 
2000). The public perception here is that market-based instruments are incapable of 
internalising externalities. It is perceived that a C&C approach can result in net 
welfare gains and it is this potential for welfare gain that generates the public demand 
for regulation. They have a high degree of acceptability because of the political 
(public, especially environmental groups) and administrative support they generate 
(Turner et al., 1994; Hanley et al., 1997).   
 
Following Viscusi et al., (1995), the externality and welfare aspects can be illustrated 
to make the arguments clearer. For example, let’s assume that the maximum value an 
individual is willing to pay for a product is V and the price of that product is P.  Then 
if V>P, the individual will buy the product and receive a surplus V-P, which is 
positive.  This is a situation where there are no externalities. Now assume that a 
19 
 negative externality, W, is present (as is usually the case with any economic activity).  
Now, the welfare effect of purchasing that commodity is (V-P) –W. Hence, if W> V-
P, then society’s welfare is reduced. The argument here is that the majority of the 
public perceive that market-based instruments (as opposed to regulation) result in too 
much economic activity being pursued. On the other hand, the public perception is 
that only a C&C approach, such as through a standard, that negative externalities can 
be avoided. Hence, the argument here is that there is demand for regulation from 
groups and that ‘the political process provides incentives for governments and 
politicians to supply regulation’ (Church and Ware, 2000). 
 
Furthermore, opposition to MBIs come from ethical implications of economic 
instruments (Hanley et al., 1997).  Kelman (1981) has pointed out that placing a price 
on the right to pollute is somehow inconsistent with the notion of environmental 
quality. His survey of US environmental lobbyists found that 68 percent of those 
interviewed took this view of pollution taxes. 
 
In addition, it is well known in the regulatory economics literature that by design or 
not, the institution that is meant to regulate is ‘captured’ by industry.  This is known 
as capture theory (Viscusi et al., 1995). According to this strand of thinking, C&C 
regulation is supplied by the regulator in response to the industry’s demand for 
regulation or the regulatory authority is controlled by industry by coercion, influence 
and ‘other methods’. However, in both cases, regulators are’ controlled’ by an 
industry or a firm.  Turner et al., (1994) elaborate this point best:  
 
“This ‘capture’ concept refers to the tendency for the regulator and the polluter to 
seek common ground and cooperation. Once captured, administrators begin to see 
that they need to protect existing members of an industry and, therefore, regulate it 
accordingly.  New entrants are excluded, subsidies are offered and difficult decisions 
are put off until prospects ‘improve’”.  
 
Young (1992) argues that this ‘rent seeking’ behaviour is inefficient and tends to bias 
investment decisions and leads to further extensions in regulatory capture. Some 
studies [see for example, Keller and Levinson (2002); List et al., (2000); List et al., 
(2004)] show that pollution abatement costs impact on investment decisions.  The 
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 hypothesis is that when the pollution abatement costs are high, investors tend to move 
to places where pollution regulation is less. This is known as the pollution haven 
hypothesis. 
 
It is not difficult to figure out as to why firms would demand C&C environmental 
regulation as opposed to demanding the use of MBIs. This is especially so in 
developing countries, although this practice is not uncommon in developed countries. 
We know that the main objective of a firm is to maximise its profits. In such a 
situation, a C&C regulatory framework is preferred because the environmental 
regulatory framework under which it has to operate is more attractive to maximise the 
firm’s economic returns rather than under a MBI framework.  Interestingly, Kelman 
(1981) found from a survey of industrialists in the US that 85 percent of them were 
opposed to pollution taxes on the grounds that these increased the financial burden 
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Figure 5 shows the pollution control approaches and the economic function for profit 
maximizing firms.  The vertical axis shows the economic benefits to producers (firms) 
and the horizontal axis shows the pollution control approaches taken from Table 1 in 
Section 2. The pollution control approaches close to the origin are C&C oriented 
(maximum government involvement) and as we move rightwards they become more 
litigation oriented (increased private initiative). The figure shows that producers who 
escape paying the social costs of pollution have higher economic returns. For 
instance, under a C&C approach, the penalties set are low.  Industry or firms capture 
the regulator to keep penalties low.  Alternatively, firms escape paying the full social 
costs of production using coercion and other means.  On the other hand when C&C 
involvement becomes less and MBIs are used, the extent of escaping paying social 
costs is less.  This is because, for instance a green tax can be levied at the point of sale 
to internalize the external costs of producing a per unit of output.  Industry coercion is 
less. Hence, economic returns fall when pollution control approaches used move 
towards MBIs.  Industry, obviously attempts to avoid such instruments. However, it 
should be pointed out that industry is likely to prefer a pollution trading scheme over 
a pollution tax for obvious reasons. As the pollution regulatory system moves towards 
a litigation approach (increased private initiative shown in Figure 5), the economic 
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 returns become even less because of the extent of private compensation due to for 
example, irreplaceable damage or deaths. Hence, in extreme cases and (and in some 
years), economic returns can be close to zero under strict liability legislation. Hence, 
based on this analysis it is possible to show which regulatory approach will be 
preferred firms if given the opportunity. This line of analysis is similar to the 
Stiglerian approach in regulatory approach [see Viscusi et al., (1995)] for a detailed 
analysis of this approach. 
 
Finally, Hanley et al., (1997) also point out that resistance to change can come from 
those who have a vested interest in ‘the preservation of the existing system, while 
bureaucracies in general may resist wholesale changes in policy’. They point out that 
economic instruments in the OECD countries were introduced ‘gradually rather than 
as a dramatic change’.  Changes are inevitable, especially when the benefits of MBIs 
become known.  However, those with vested interests will strive to retain the old 
system because it serves their own interests better. 
 
Environmental and health effects 
 
By not accounting for social costs of pollution, producers (firms) clearly benefit from 
such production. In other words, not taking into account the social costs increase the 
economic returns to firms. This is because firms are using unpriced environmental 
goods and services free of charge. In other words, the firm is over utilizing resources 
because the price paid for such goods and services is zero. 
 
However, such a strategy has many social costs since pollution generated from 
hundreds or even thousands of firms (see Table 2) has various impacts.  For example, 
pollution affects health (human capital), environment (biodiversity), capital and other 
production processes. These impacts are well documented in the relevant literature 
(for example see WRI, 2009).  As pollution increases, so do the severity of impacts 
and very often the impacts are magnified. Furthermore, the impacts are not only 
within the sector but also affect other sectors as well.  The impacts are also 
intergenerational. Not only are the use and non use environmental values are 
damaged, but the optional (future) values are also damaged. Some of the impacts also 
23 
 cause irreversible damage (e.g. extinction of species).  This is especially so for an 
island that is very rich in biodiversity. 
 
While the use of resources in this manner clearly benefits private producers (firms) 
such a strategy will no doubt have an impact on the environment and thereby on 
society as a whole. 
 
As discussed in Section 4, myopic, foot-loose profit maximising firms are likely to 
favour a C&C approach to pollution control.  This they do to maximise their gains and 
the regulator may not intervene for fear that firms may leave if costs of compliance 
(covering social costs) increase. Such a strategy, although increases production and 
result in higher economic growth and output (measured as GDP), the social costs are 
likely to reduce output in the medium and in the long term due to pollution damage to 
factors of production in the form of environment (land), health (labour) and capital. 
Stiglitz (2009) mentions such a situation in an article entitled ‘GDP Fetishism’. This 
scenario is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6:  Economic growth without considering pollution impacts is detrimental to 
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The line ABC represents economic growth when pollution is checked. Economic 
growth is assumed to be constant.  This is a sustainable path where the pollution 
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 released into the environment is cleaned up.  The environmental and health impacts 
are not major. This limits economic growth, but more sustainable.  However, if 
external costs are not taken into account, more output will be produced. This is 
because only the private costs of production are considered.  When such a system is 
adopted at time t1, high economic returns (GDP) are generated which is shown by line 
BDE.  Under such a system economic returns (output) are much larger because social 
costs of production are not taken into account.  However, the system has a problem. It 
is unsustainable.  This is because the pollution released is greater than the assimilative 
capacity of the environment and very little clean-up is involved, pollution begins to 
impact on production and hence economic growth.  This is shown by the falling 
broken line, EF.  Production will continue on FG line and will remain so for a long 
time if factors of production have been damaged or disappeared.  On the other hand if 
the environment recovers, economic growth may take place at a higher level shown 
by the upward sloping line, FH. With time, it is possible to reach the ABC line.  




A multitude of policy implications arise by following a wholly C&C approach to 
pollution control. It has far reaching consequences for the control of pollution, 
investment and economic growth.  They are discussed briefly.  
 
First, a large number of MBIs have been in existence for more than three decades and 
they have been shown could be effective in internalising externalities.  CAC has a role 
to play but relying wholly on such approaches is short sighted and does not spur 
innovation and development of new technologies. 
 
Second, adopting a wholly CAC approach sends the wrong signals to potential 
overseas investors.  In other words, this is saying that the country is adopting only a 
CAC approach, and hence it is subject to low compliance and pollution issues take a 
low priority.  This idea is consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis.  This means 
that polluting industries with old technology (meeting the basic standards) will invest.  
This strategy is a drawback to innovation and investment in ‘smart’ technology. 
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 Third, pollution generated will result in negative externalities which will impact on 
economic growth and thereby affect society as a whole.  This will no doubt impact on 
future production and generations. 
 
Fourth, many economies are moving towards combating greenhouse gasses such as 
CO2 in response to combating global warming.  There is little doubt MBIs will play a 
big role in reducing greenhouse gasses in the next few decades. Hence, Sri Lanka will 
be left behind and looses credibility in taking action against global warming.  Future 
green taxes could be imposed on the country’s exports. 
 
Fifth, having relied wholly on CAC instruments to control pollution in the country, 
Sri Lanka has a big task ahead in setting up the necessary administrative structures if 
and when MBI instruments are to be introduced.  Setting up such a structure involving 




The merits and de-merits of a C&C approach and MBIs were discussed and it was 
shown that, at least theoretically, MBIs have a clear advantage.  The use of MBIs is 
consistent with open market economic policies that Sri Lanka has adopted since 1978. 
However, to date the country has been adopting a wholly C&C approach to pollution 
control which in some respects is outdated. C&C approaches are synonymous with 
economic policies Sri Lanka adopted prior to 1978 open market economic reforms. 
 
Despite the many environmental standards set for thousands of firms, pollution is a 
problem in the country and pollution is increasing.  It is clear that the C&C approach 
Sri Lanka has adopted has shortcomings judging by the social costs of production 
imposed on society. Hence, this is an opportunity for MBIs to be implemented or even 
a combination of MBI and C&C approaches. 
 
Since Sri Lanka continues to adopt a C&C approach to control pollution despite MBIs 
being less cumbersome it was imperative to hypothesise the likely reasons for doing 
so. They were discussed based on the literature on regulatory and environmental 
economics. The consequences of pollution exceeding the assimilative capacity were 
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 discussed where it was shown that if pollution continues unabated, it is likely that the 
quality of life of society would decrease.  This is due to environmental degradation 
and health effects. Furthermore, the policy implications of Sri Lanka using only 
C&Cs were discussed. 
 
Given the issues discussed and Sri Lanka attracting foreign investment, especially in a 
post war period, it is imperative that policy decision-makers examine MBIs based on 
their merits. In any case the international experience shows that MBIs will play a 
greater role in the decades to come especially in a climate of combating greenhouse 
gasses.  Sri Lanka in many respects has very few options left other than to undertake 
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